Preparata - Conjuring Hitler- How Britain And America Made the Third Reich (2005)
Excerpt:
The poor treatment of the Nazi gestation is due to two factors: fi rst,
the historical interval that covers the breeding of Hitlerism is notoriously
complex, and that does not make for 'good cinema': for instance, when
the Crisis hit the West in 1930, and the Nazis began to gather votes, Liberal
historians hand the narration over to their fellow economists, and the
economists, who understand famously nothing of the Crisis, throw it back
to the historians, who are thus saddled with the last and sadly disappointing
word in the current, miserable explication of the Nazis' rise to power.
Second, a detailed analysis of the emergence of Nazism is generally
shunned so it seems, for it might reveal too much; in truth, it might
disclose that the Nazis were
never a creature of chance. The thesis of thebook suggests that
for 15 years (1919-33), the Anglo-Saxon elites tamperedwith German politics with the conscious intent to obtain a reactionary
movement, which they could then set up as a pawn for their geopolitical
intrigues. When this movement emerged immediately after World War I in
the shape of a religious, anti-Semitic sect disguised as a political party (that
is, the NSDAP), the British clubs kept it under close observation, proceeded
to endorse it semi-offi cially in 1931 when the Weimar Republic was being
dismantled by the Crisis, and fi nally embraced it, with deceit, throughout
the 1930s. This is to say that although England did not conceive Hitlerism,
she nonetheless created the conditions under which such a phenomenon
could appear, and devoted herself to supporting financially the Nazis and
subsequently arming them to the teeth with the prospect of manipulating
them. Without such methodical and unsparing 'protection' on the part
of the Anglo-American elites, along with the complicit buttress of Soviet
Russia, there would have been no Führer and no Nazism: the political
dynamism of the Nazi movement owed its success to a general state of
instability in Germany, which was wholly artifi cial, a wreckage engineered
by the Anglo-American clubs themselves.
By 'clubs' and 'elites' I mean the established and self-perpetuating
fraternities that ruled the Anglo-Saxon commonwealths: these were (and
still are) formed by an aggregation of dynasts issued from the banking
houses, the diplomatic corps, the officer caste, and the executive aristocracy,
which still remains solidly entrenched in the constitutional fabric of
the modern 'democracies.' These 'clubs' act, rule, breed and think like
a compact oligarchy, and co-opt the middle class to use it as a filter
between themselves and their cannon fodder: the commoners. In fact,
in the so-called 'democratic constituency,' which represents to date the
most sophisticated model of oligarchic rule, the electorate wields no clout
whatever, and political ability is but another expression for the powers of
persuasion needed to 'build consensus' around (momentous) decisions
already taken elsewhere.3
3. So-called 'democracy' is a sham, the ballot a travesty. In modern bureaucratized
systems, whose birth dates from the mid-nineteenth century, the feudal organization
has been carried to the next level, so to speak. A chief objective of what Thucydides
referred to in his epoch as synomosiai (literally 'exchanges of oaths'), that is, the outof-
sight fraternities acting behind the ruling clans, has been to make the process of the
exaction of rents from the population (a 'free income' in the form of rents, financial
charges and like thefts) as unfathomable and impenetrable as possible. The tremendous
sophistication, and the propagandistic wall of artfully divulged misconceptions
surrounding the banking system (we will return to this theme in Chapter 4), which is
the chief instrument wherewith the hierarchs expropriate and control the wealth of
their supporting community, is the limpid testimony of this essential transformation
undergone by the feudal/oligarchic organization in the modern era. The West has
moved from a low-tech agrarian establishment built upon the backs of disenfranchised
serfs to a highly mechanized post-industrial hive that feeds off the strength of no less
disenfranchised blue- and white-collar slaves, whose lives are mortgaged to buy into the
vogue of modern consumption. The latter-day lords of the manor are no longer seen
demanding tribute since they have relied on the mechanics of banking accounts for the
purpose, whereas the sycophants of the median class, as academics and publicists, have
consistently remained loyal to the synomosiai. The other concrete difference between
yesterday and today is the immensely increased throughput of industrial production
(whose potential level, however, has always been signifi cantly higher than the actual
one, to keep prices high). As for the 'democratic participation' of the ordinary citizens,
these know in their hearts that they never decide anything of weight, and that politics
consists in the art of swaying the mobs in one direction or another according to the
wishes and anticipations of the few having the keys to information, intelligence and
fi nance. These few may at a point in time be more or less divided into warring factions;
the deeper the division, the bloodier the social strife. The electoral record of the West
in the past century is a shining monument to the utter inconsequence of 'democracy':
in spite of two cataclysmic wars and a late system of proportional representation that
yielded a plethora of parties, Western Europe has seen no signifi cant shift in her socioeconomic
constitution, whereas America has become, as time progressed, ever more
identical to her late oligarchic self, having reduced the democratic pageant to a contest
between two rival wings of an ideologically compact monopartite structure, which is in
fact 'lobbied' by more or less hidden 'clubs': the degree of public participation in this
fl agrant mockery is, as known, understandably lowest: a third of the franchise at best.





